FIRST
DIVISION
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CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION,
BENJAMIN CHUA JR., VIRGILIO AGERO, and LEONARDO VISORRO, JR.,
Petitioners, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CAPASCO Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 164561 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: August 30, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a special civil action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (1) the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57179 dated 28 October 2003 which
annulled the Decision[2] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 017822-99 dated
25 August 1999, thereby, reinstating the Decision[3] of
Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos dated 7 August 1998; and (2) the
Resolution[4] of
the same court, dated 3 June 2004, which denied the petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Herein
petitioners are Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation (CAPASCO), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel products; Benjamin
Chua, Jr. (now deceased), the former CAPASCO President; Virgilio
Agerro, CAPASCO’s
Vice-President; and Leonardo Visorro, Jr., CAPASCO’s Administrative-Personnel Manager. Herein private respondents are Enrique
Tamondong III, the Personnel Superintendent of CAPASCO who was previously
assigned at the petitioners’ Cainta Plant, and CAPASCO Union of Supervisory
Employees (CUSE), a duly registered union of CAPASCO.
The
facts of the case are as follows:
Four
former employees of CAPASCO originally filed this labor case before the NLRC,
namely:
Petitioner
CAPASCO, hired private respondent Tamondong as
Assistant to the Personnel Manager for its Cainta Plant on
Private
respondent Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as an act
involving unfair labor practice by filing a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and
Unfair Labor Practice before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch IV. According to him, there was no just cause for
his dismissal and it was anchored solely on his involvement and active
participation in the organization of the union of supervisory personnel in
CAPASCO. Though private respondent Tamondong admitted his active role in the formation of a
union composed of supervisory personnel in the company, he claimed that such was
not a valid ground to terminate his employment because it was a legitimate
exercise of his constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization.
In
contrast, petitioner CAPASCO contended that by virtue of private respondent Tamondong’s position as Personnel Superintendent and the
functions actually performed by him in the company, he was considered as a
managerial employee, thus, under the law he was prohibited from joining a union
as well as from being elected as one of its officers. Accordingly, petitioners maintained their argument
that the dismissal of private respondent Tamondong was
perfectly valid based on loss of trust and confidence because of the latter’s
active participation in the affairs of the union.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding [petitioner CAPASCO] guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. Concomitantly, [petitioner CAPASCO] is hereby ordered:
1. To cease and desist from further committing acts of unfair labor practice, as charged;
2. To reinstate [private respondent Tamondong] to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and his full backwages inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement, and herein partially computed as follows:
a) P167,076.00
- backwages from
b) P18,564.00 - 13th month pay
for 1997 and 1998;
c) P4,284.00 -
d) P3,570.00 - Service Incentive
Leave for 1997 and 1998.
P
193,494.00 - Total partial backwages and benefits.[11]
Aggrieved,
petitioners appealed the afore-quoted Decision to the NLRC. On
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED:
a) Dismissing the Complaint for Illegal Dismissal filed by [private respondent Tamondong] for utter lack of merit;
b) Dismissing the Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice for lack of factual basis;
c) Deleting the awards to [private respondent Tamondong] of backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees;
d)
Affirming the awards to [private respondent Tamondong], representing 13th month pay for 1997
and 1998, holiday pay for 12 days, and service incentive leave for 1997 totaling
P26,418.00; and
e)
Ordering the payment of backwages to [private
respondent Tamondong] reckoned from
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration, while, private
respondent Tamondong filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said NLRC
Decision, but the NLRC affirmed its original Decision in its Resolution[13]
dated
Dissatisfied
with the above-mentioned Decision of the NLRC, private respondents Tamondong
and CUSE filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Then, the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and the herein assailed Decision dated August
25, 1999 of the NLRC, Third Division is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated
Consequently,
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision of the
Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court
of Appeals denied the said Motion for Reconsideration for want of convincing
and compelling reason to warrant a reversal of its judgment.
Hence,
this present Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In
the Memorandum[15] filed
by petitioners, they aver that private respondent Tamondong as Personnel
Superintendent of CAPASCO was performing functions of a managerial employee
because he was the one laying down major management policies on personnel
relations such as: issuing memos on company rules and regulations, imposing
disciplinary sanctions such as warnings and suspensions, and executing the same
with full power and discretion. They
claim that no further approval or review is necessary for private respondent Tamondong to execute these functions, and the notations
“NOTED BY” of petitioner Agerro, the Vice-President
of petitioner CAPA
Petitioners
further argue that they are not guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice because private respondent Tamondong was validly dismissed and the
reason for preventing him to join a labor union was the nature of his position
and functions as Personnel Superintendent, which position was incompatible and
in conflict with his union activities.
Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals to rule that petitioner CAPASCO was guilty of illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice.
Lastly, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion when it reinstated the Decision of Executive
Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos holding CAPASCO liable for backwages, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
On
the other hand, private respondents, assert that the assailed Decision being a
final disposition of the Court of Appeals is appealable
to this Court by a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not under Rule 65 thereof. They also claim that petitioners new ground
that private respondent Tamondong was a confidential employee of CAPASCO, thus,
prohibited from participating in union activities, is not a valid ground to be
raised in this Petition for Certiorari
seeking the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Now,
given the foregoing arguments raise by both parties, the threshold issue that
must first be resolved is whether or not the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
the proper remedy for the petitioners, to warrant the reversal of the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 October 2003 and 3 June 2004,
respectively.
The
petition must fail.
The special civil action for Certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16]
The
essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[17] Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from
absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a
tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the
particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the
exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.[18] Without jurisdiction means lack or want of
legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.[19] Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.[20]
In
the case before this Court, petitioners fail to meet the third requisite for
the proper invocation of Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, to wit: that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They simply alleged that the Court of Appeals
gravely abuse its discretion which amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution.
They did not bother to explain why an appeal cannot possibly cure the
errors committed by the appellate court.
It must be noted that the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
was already a disposition on the merits; this Court has no remaining issues to
resolve, hence, the proper remedy available to the petitioners is to file
Petition for Review under Rule 45 not under Rule 65.
Additionally,
the general rule is that a writ of certiorari
will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved
party. The remedies of appeal in the
ordinary course of law and that of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative.[21] Time and again this Court reminded members of
the bench and bar that the special civil action of Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal[22]
where the latter remedy is available. Such
a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. Nor can it be availed of as a substitute for
the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was
occasioned by one’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.[23]
In
the case at bar, petitioners received on
Accordingly,
where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness
of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision,
the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.[27] It is obvious in this case that the arguments
raised by the petitioners delved into the wisdom or legal soundness of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, therefore, the proper remedy is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45. Consequently, it is incumbent upon
this Court to dismiss this Petition.
In any event, granting arguendo, that the present
petition is proper, still it is dismissible. The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the NLRC because the findings of the
Court of Appeals that private respondent Tamondong was
indeed a supervisory employee and not a managerial employee, thus, eligible to
join or participate in the union activities of private respondent CUSE, were
supported by evidence on record. In the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
Moreover,
the Court of Appeals also held that upon careful examination of the documents
submitted before it, it found out that:
[Private respondent] Tamondong may have possessed enormous powers and was performing important functions that goes with the position of Personnel Superintendent, nevertheless, there was no clear showing that he is at liberty, by using his own discretion and disposition, to lay down and execute major business and operational policies for and in behalf of CAPASCO. [Petitioner] CAPASCO miserably failed to establish that [private respondent] Tamondong was authorized to act in the interest of the company using his independent judgment. x x x. Withal, [private respondent] Tamondong may have been exercising certain important powers, such as control and supervision over erring rank-and-file employees, however, x x x he does not possess the power to hire, transfer, terminate, or discipline erring employees of the company. At the most, the record merely showed that [private respondent] Tamondong informed and warned rank-and-file employees with respect to their violations of CAPASCO’s rules and regulations. x x x. [Also, the functions performed by private respondent such as] issuance of warning[31] to employees with irregular attendance and unauthorized leave of absences and requiring employees to explain regarding charges of abandonment of work, are normally performed by a mere supervisor, and not by a manager.[32]
Accordingly,
Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, as amended, differentiates supervisory
employees from managerial employees, to wit: supervisory employees are those
who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions, if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary
or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment; whereas,
managerial employees are those who are vested with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Thus, from the foregoing provision of the
Labor Code, it can be clearly inferred that private respondent Tamondong was just a supervisory employee. Private respondent Tamondong
did not perform any of the functions of a managerial employee as stated in the
definition given to it by the Code. Hence,
the Labor Code[33]
provisions regarding disqualification of a managerial employee from joining,
assisting or forming any labor organization does not apply to herein private
respondent Tamondong.
Being a supervisory employee of CAPASCO, he cannot be prohibited from
joining or participating in the union activities of private respondent CUSE, and
in making such a conclusion, the Court of Appeals did not act whimsically,
capriciously or in a despotic manner, rather, it was guided by the evidence
submitted before it. Thus, given the
foregoing findings of the Court of Appeals that private respondent is a
supervisory employee, it is indeed an unfair labor practice[34]
on the part of petitioner CAPASCO to dismiss him on account of his union
activities, thereby curtailing his constitutionally guaranteed right to
self-organization.[35]
With
regard to the allegation that private respondent Tamondong
was not only a managerial employee but also a confidential employee, the same cannot
be validly raised in this Petition for Certiorari. It is settled that an issue which was not
raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This principle applies to a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.[36] In addition, petitioners failed to adduced evidence
which will prove that, indeed, private respondent was also a confidential
employee.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo- Dadole and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 27-35.
[2] Penned by Commissioner Ireneo B. Bernardo with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, concurring; id. at 151-161.
[3] Penned by Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, id. at 128-150.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] People
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142051,
[17] Rivera v. Espiritu, 425 Phil. 169, 179-180 (2002).
[18] Land
Bank of the
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Land
Bank of the
[23] Land
Bank of the
[24] Land
Bank of the
[25] 335 Phil. 1066 (1997).
[26]
[27] A.F. Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147079, 21 December 2004, 447 SCRA 427, 436, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18 at 482.
[28]
[29] 218 Phil. 719, 726 (1984).
[30] Among the characteristics of the managerial rank are: (1) he is not subject to the rigid observance of regular office hours; (2) his work requires the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (3) the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (4) he manages a customarily recognized department or subdivision of the establishment, customarily and regularly directing the work of other employees therein; (5) he either has the authority to hire or discharge other employees or his suggestions and recommendations as to hiring and discharging, advancement and promotion or other change of status of other employees are given particular weight; and (6) as a rule, he is not paid hourly wages nor subjected to maximum hours of work.
[31] Rollo,
pp. 97-99; p. 102.
[32]
[33] Article 245. Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to join any labor organization; Right of Supervisory Employees. – Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
[34] Aricle 248(a) of the Labor Code as amended.
[35] Article 13, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
[36] Buñag v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 216 (1999).